For the Opponent claim is that Socrates is good in virtue of

Nominalism and Realism

canada goose clearance canada goose outlet trillium parka black As magnificent a subject as philosophy is, grappling as it does with the ultimate concerns of human existence, and thus surpassing in nobility any other human pursuit, it is also miserable in that nothing goes uncontested, and nothing ever gets established to the satisfaction of all competent practitioners. (This is true of disciplines as well, but in philosophy it is true in excelsis.) Suppose I say, as I have in various places: canada goose clearance

canada goose store That things have properties and stand in relations I take to be a plain Moorean fact beyond the reach of reasonable controversy. After all, my cat is black and he is sleeping next to my blue coffee cup. ‘Black’ picks out a property, an extralinguistic feature of my cat. canada goose store

Is that obvious? Not to some. Not to the ornery and recalcitrant critter known as the ostrich nominalist. My cat, Max Black, is black. That, surely, canada goose outlet is a Moorean fact. consider the following biconditional and consider whether it too is a canada goose outlet store calgary Moorean fact:

1. Max is black iff Max has the property of being black.

buy canada goose jacket cheap As I see it, there are canada goose outlet uk three main ways of construing a biconditional such as (1): buy canada goose jacket cheap

canada goose black friday sale A. Ostrich Nominalism. The right hand side (RHS) says exactly what the left hand side (LHS) says, but in a verbose and high falutin and dispensable way. Thus the use of on the RHS does not commit one ontologically to properties beyond predicates. (By definition, predicates are linguistic items while properties are extralinguistic and extramental.) Predication is primitive and in need of no philosophical explanation. On this approach, (1) is trivially true. One needn posit properties, and in consequence one needn worry about the nature of property possession. (Is Max related to his blackness, or does Max have his blackness quasi mereologically having it as an ontological constituent of him?) canada goose black friday sale

Canada Goose Parka B. Ostrich Realism. The RHS commits one ontologically to properties, but no sense does the RHS canada goose outlet us serve to ground or explain the LHS. On canada goose outlet canada this approach, (1) is false if there are no properties. For the ostrich realist, (1) is true, indeed necessarily true, but it is not the case that the LHS is true because the RHS is true. Such notions as metaphysical grounding and philosophical explanation are foreign to the ostrich realist, but not in virtue of his canada goose parka outlet being a realist, but virtue of his being an ostrich. Canada Goose Parka

canada goose coats C. Non Ostrich Realism. On canada goose outlet in chicago this approach, the RHS both commits one to properties, but also proffers a metaphysical ground of the truth of the LHS: the LHS is true because (ontologically or metaphysically speaking) the concrete particular Max has the property of being black, and not canada goose outlet real vice versa. canada goose coats

Canada Goose Jackets Note 1: Explanation is asymmetrical; biconditionality is symmetrical. Canada Goose Jackets

canada goose clearance sale Note 2: Properties needn be universals. They might be (abstract) particulars (unrepeatables) such as the tropes of D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell. Properties must, however, be extralinguistic and extramental, by definition. Predication is primitive and in need of no explanation. In virtue of what does canada goose outlet toronto location correctly apply to Max? In virtue of nothing. It just applies to him and does so correctly. Max is black, but there is no feature of reality that explains why is true canada goose outlet uk sale of Max, or why is black is true. It is just true! There is nothing in reality that serves as the ontological ground of this contingent truth. Nothing it true. There are no truth makers and no need for any. canada goose clearance sale

cheap Canada Goose I find ostrich nominalism preposterous. is true of Max, is not, but there canada goose outlet ontario is no feature of reality, canada goose outlet website legit nothing in or at or about Max that explains why the one predicate is true of him and the other is not!? This is not really an argument but more an expression of incomprehension or incredulity, an autobiographical comment, if you will. I may just be petering out, pace Professor van Inwagen. cheap Canada Goose

Can I do better canada goose jacket outlet uk than peter? is a predicate of English. Schwarz is a predicate of German. If there are no properties, then Max is black relative to English, schwarz relative to German, noir relative canada goose sale uk to French, and no one color. But this is absurd. Max is not three different colors, but one color, the color we use to pick out, and the Germans use to pick out. Karl, Pierre, and I look at Max we see the same color. So there is one color we both see which would goose outlet canada not be the case if there were no properties beyond predicates. It is not as if I see the color black while Karl sees the color schwarz. We see the same color. And we see it at the cat. This is not a visio intellectualis whereby we peer into some Platonic topos ouranos., there is something in, at, or about the cat, something extralinguistic, that grounds the correctness of the application of the predicate to the cat.

A related argument. I say, is black. Karl says, Max ist schwarz. and ist are token distinct and type distinct words of different languages. If there is nothing in reality (no relation whether of instantiation or of constituency, non relational tie, Bergmannian nexus, etc.) that the copula picks out, then it is only relative to German that Max ist schwarz, and only relative to English that Max is black. But this is absurd. There are not two different facts here but one. Max is the same color for Karl and me, and his being black is the same fact for Karl and me.

Canada Goose Outlet Finally, is black is true. Is it true ex vi terminorum? Of course not. It is contingently true. Is it just contingently true? Of course not. It is true because of the way extralinguistic reality arranged. is modally contingent, but also contingent upon the way the world is. this cat that exists whether or not any language exists, and it is black whether or not any language exists. Canada Goose Outlet

canada goose coats on sale, I say that for a predicate to be contingently true of an individual, canada goose factory outlet vancouver (i) there must be individuals independently of language; (ii) there must be properties independently of language; and there must be facts or truth making states of affairs independently of language. Otherwise, you end up with (i) total linguistic idealism, which is absurd; or (ii) linguistic idealism about properties which is absurd; or (iii) a chaos, a world of disconnected particulars and properties. canada goose coats on sale

Canada Goose sale The above is a shoot from the hip, bloggity blog exposition of ideas that can be put more rigorously, but it seems to to me to show that ostrich nominalism and ostrich realism for that matter are untenable and this despite the fact that a positive theory invoking facts has its own very serious problems. Canada Goose sale

buy canada goose jacket Metaphilosophical Coda: If a theory has insurmountable problems, these problems are not removed by the fact that every other theory has problems. For it might be that no theory is tenable,while the problem itself is genuine. buy canada goose jacket

We nominalists hold that is good is true when what is signified by and what is signified by are numerically one and the same thing.

I stumble over this. I don understand. unlike is a common term: it applies to many individuals. So there cannot be numerically one thing that both and signify. signifies one thing; signifies many things.

Canada Goose online If, contrary to fact, there were only one good thing, then it would make some sense to say that is good, which is by its surface grammar a predication, could be read as asserting the numerical identity of Socrates with the one good canada goose outlet winnipeg thing. if Socrates is good, or seated, or conversing with Theaetetus, this is only contingently the case. So how analyze the possibly true is not good on the assumption that there is only one good thing? would have to say that Socrates is distinct from himself which is absurd. if, in actuality, Socrates is good in virtue of canada goose outlet uk fake being identical to the one good thing, then, in the possible counterfactual situation in which he the very same individual not good, he would have to be numerically diverse from the one good thing, namely, himself! Canada Goose online

canadian goose jacket The same argument goes through even if there are many good things. For the Opponent claim is that Socrates is good in virtue of being identical to one of the many good things. Call this good thing G. claim is that is good is an identity proposition in disguise, and that its deep logical form is: S = canada goose outlet edmonton G. canadian goose jacket

canada goose The problem is that is good is contingently true. But = G is not contingently true. So the predication is not an identity proposition in disguise. canada goose

I am canada goose parka uk assuming something that is well nigh self evident, but which I fear the Illustrious Opponent will deny, namely, that if a = b, then this is non contingently the case. other words, I am assuming that if a = b, then canada goose kensington parka uk there is no possible situation in which a and b both exist but are numerically distinct.

canada goose deals Curiously, the Opponent theory works in one case and one case only. But he has to admit the divine simplicity. assume that God exists, that God is essentially good, and that God is identical to his attributes, and that therefore God alone is good in this sense. If God is identical to his attributes, then God = the one and only good thing. (Socrates is good only in an analogical and derivative sense.) In this one case, is good is an identity proposition in disguise canada goose deals.